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The District Court Erred By Suppressing Evidence Because The Stop Was 
Justified By Reasonable Suspicion, The Arrest Was Justified By Probable 
Cause, And The Search Of Garcia’s Person Was Proper Incident To Arrest 
 
A. The Traffic Stop Was Supported By Reasonable Suspicion Of A Traffic 
Infraction 
 
 It is undisputed that Garcia crossed over the fog line on a freeway off-
ramp.  (R., p. 175; Tr., p. 34, Ls. 6-25.)  This provided reasonable suspicion for 
Trooper Otto to conduct a traffic stop.  State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 298, 32 
P.3d 685, 690 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, ___, 362 
P.3d 514, 522 (2015) (“We hold that driving onto but not across the line marking 
the right edge of the road does not violate Idaho Code section 49-637” 
(emphasis added)); id., 362 P.3d at 523-24 (driving on the right white line means 
car is no longer being driven “within its lane of travel”) (J. Jones, J., and Kidwell, 
J. pro tem, dissenting).  Because crossing over the fog line (as opposed to 
merely driving on top of it) creates reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, the 
district court erred by concluding the traffic stop was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.) 
 Garcia attempts to distinguish Slater and Neal, and the underlying 
statutes (I.C. §§ 49-301(1) and 49-637), on the basis that he was on a single-
lane off ramp, and there is no law that requires a motorist on a single-lane 
highway to maintain that lane.1  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 10-12.)  The biggest 
                                            
1 Garcia acknowledges (Respondent’s brief, p. 11) that he cannot factually 
distinguish Slater, which involved crossing “the fog line on the side of the 
highway on-ramp.”  Slater, 136 Idaho at 296, 32 P.3d at 688. 
2 
flaw in this argument is Garcia’s false assumption that the off ramp was not part 
of I-84, clearly not a single-lane highway.  In Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 
557, 808 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1991), the Court:  
conclude[d] that, based upon the definition of “highways” in I.C. § 
40–109(5), the runaway escape ramps are, as a matter of law, part 
of the highway district road system, being a “roadside 
improvements, adjacent lands or interests lawfully acquired, 
pedestrian facilities, and any other structures, works or fixtures 
incidental to the preservation or improvement of the highways. ....” 
I.C. § 40–109(5). 
   
(Emphasis original.)  If runaway escape ramps are part of the highway as a 
matter of law, it makes little sense to interpret on and off ramps as not part of the 
highway.  Because the off ramp was not a separate “highway” from I-84, the 
argument that the rules requiring motorists to maintain their lanes of travel did 
not apply to it necessarily fails.   
 A motorist must generally maintain his lane of travel.  I.C. §§ 49-301(1), 
49-637.  Failing to maintain that lane of travel by crossing the fog line creates 
reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop.  Neal, 159 Idaho at ___, 362 P.3d 
at 522; Slater, 136 Idaho at 298, 32 P.3d at 690.  Trooper Otto had reasonable 
suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of Garcia’s vehicle when it crossed the fog line 
on the Jerome off ramp of I-84.    
 
B. The Continued Detention And Ultimate Arrest Of Garcia Was Supported 
By Probable Cause And Therefore Proper 
 
 After the stop Trooper Otto asked Garcia for his driver’s license.  (Tr., p. 
39, Ls. 10-12.)  Garcia admitted he did not have a driver’s license and produced 
as identification only a Mexican consular card.  (Tr., p. 15, L. 25 – p. 16, L. 3; p. 
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37, L. 2 – p. 38, L. 10.)  At that point Trooper Otto had probable cause to arrest 
Garcia and search him incident to arrest.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-8.) 
 Garcia first argues that the state, in its Appellant’s brief, failed to challenge 
the finding that the investigative detention was prolonged, and that the trooper 
should have issued a citation ending the detention.  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 13-
14.)  This argument fails to comprehend the difference between an investigative 
detention based on reasonable suspicion and an arrest based on probable 
cause. 
 An investigative decision based on reasonable suspicion must be limited 
in scope in that it must not be “more intrusive or of longer duration than 
reasonably necessary to effectuate the investigative detention.”  State v. 
Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362, 17 P.3d 301, 306 (Ct. App. 2000).  An 
investigative detention can be rendered a de facto arrest if it is “more intrusive” 
than necessary, e.g., State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 901 P.2d 1321 (1995) 
(use of handcuffs), or if it is of “longer duration” than reasonably necessary to 
confirm or dispel suspicion, e.g., State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 796-97, 964 P.2d 
660, 663-64 (1998).  However, if the de facto arrest is justified by probable 
cause, the expansion of the stop as to its intrusiveness and duration is 
constitutionally reasonable.  State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 57, 175 P.3d 216, 219 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); State v. 
Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991)).  
As set forth in more detail in the initial briefing, Trooper Otto had probable 
cause to arrest Garcia from the moment Garcia produced a consulate card 
4 
instead of a driver’s license and admitted he did not have a driver’s license.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-8.)  Garcia’s argument that the state failed to address, 
and therefore waived, the district court’s determination that the stop had been 
expanded, and therefore had become a de facto arrest, is specious.  That the 
state justified the extended duration by showing that any de facto arrest was 
constitutionally proper because based on probable cause squarely addressed, 
and refuted, the district court’s opinion that the traffic stop was unreasonably 
extended.   
Garcia next contends that “Trooper Otto had no probable cause to arrest” 
him.  (Respondent’s brief, p. 15.)  “Probable cause exists when the facts and 
circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the 
offense has been or is being committed.”  State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816, 
203 P.3d 1203, 1215 (2009) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).    The 
crime of driving without a license is committed by driving “any motor vehicle upon 
a highway” without a “current and valid Idaho driver’s license.”  I.C. § 49-301(1).  
Trooper Otto saw Garcia drive a motor vehicle upon a highway and Garcia 
admitted he did not have a current and valid Idaho (or any other) driver’s license.   
(Tr., p. 14, L. 10 – p. 15, L. 1; p. 34, L. 6 – p. 37, L. 10; p. 39, Ls. 13-15.)  There 
is no credible argument that Trooper Otto lacked probable cause to believe 
Garcia was driving without a license. 
Garcia’s argument is better characterized as contending that Trooper Otto 
lacked legal authority to arrest under state statutes.  Garcia’s argument hinges 
squarely upon the assertion that Trooper Otto was required by I.C. § 49-1407 to 
5 
cite him for the misdemeanor rather than arrest him.  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 
13-15.)  To accept such an argument this Court would have to disregard 
precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States.  In Virginia v. Moore, 
553 U.S. 164, 171-72 (2008), the Court held that probable cause to believe the 
defendant committed a crime constitutionally justifies an arrest regardless of 
state laws imposing additional limitations or requirements.  Because Trooper 
Otto had probable cause to believe Garcia had committed the misdemeanor of 
driving without a license, the arrest of Garcia was constitutionally reasonable.  
State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 887-888, 354 P.3d 446, 449-450 (2015).  
Garcia argues that this Court must disregard controlling Supreme Court 
precedent “[b]ecause the state did not raise that argument below.”  
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 15-16.2)  Garcia’s argument fails, however, because the 
issue of whether the “stop and search” were constitutionally reasonable was 
raised by Garcia in his motion.  (R., pp. 69 (motion), 98 (Garcia admits he was 
                                            
2 Garcia also argues that he furnished “satisfactory evidence of identity” and the 
officer did not have “reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person will 
disregard a written promise to appear in court” as provided as grounds for arrest 
in I.C. § 49-1407(1).  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 16-17.)  The state’s argument is 
before this court (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8) and need not be restated.  The state 
notes, however, that the claim that the prosecutor “waived” consideration of 
whether a Mexican consular card is “satisfactory evidence of identity” is 
baseless.  The state’s brief filed before the district court clearly stated that a 
“Mexican Consular card is not satisfactory evidence of identification.”  (R., p. 
121.)  At oral argument the prosecutor argued that “the defendant did not have 
what would appear to be valid identification [so] there’s no way to verify he was 
who he says he was.”  (Tr., p. 123, L. 21 – p. 124, L. 6.)  The record shows that 
the application of the statute was raised by the defense and the state did not 
concede that the consular card was sufficient identification, especially in light of 
evidence that Garcia did not appear on any available data base to confirm the 
consular card. 
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arrested for not having a driver’s license), 104 (Garcia argues lack of a driver’s 
license is “not relevant”).)  The prosecutor did not have a duty to negate every 
legal claim proposed in the motion to suppress, only establish the facts showing 
the officer’s actions were reasonable.  State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 599 n.1, 
237 P.3d 1222, 1225 n.1 (Ct. App. 2010) (appellate court not limited in challenge 
to ruling on suppression to legal arguments of prosecutor); State v. Bower, 135 
Idaho 554, 557-58, 21 P.3d 491, 494-95 (Ct. App. 2001) (state need not 
articulate every legal theory justifying search where constitutionality of search is 
brought into issue by a defense motion to suppress and countered by 
presentation of evidence).  Moreover, after concluding that Garcia was “arrested 
for Failure to Purchase a Driver’s License,” the district court specifically 
determined that the arrest was not valid under I.C. § 49-1407.  (R., pp. 159-164.)  
Whether the arrest was rendered constitutionally insufficient for failing to follow 
state law was thus clearly raised to and decided by the trial court.  The trial court 
clearly made “an adverse ruling which forms the basis for an assignment of 
error.”  State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 296 (1999) (quoting 
State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993)); see also State v. 
DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 554, 961 P.2d 641, 645 (1998) (issues actually decided 
by trial court are subject to appellate review).  Whether the arrest for failure to 
purchase a driver’s license was valid and justified the search incident to arrest 
was clearly a central issue to the motion to suppress, and actually decided by the 
district court.  Garcia’s argument—that the appellate court can review the district 
court’s holding, but must apply an erroneous legal standard—is without merit. 
7 
 The record shows that Trooper Otto had probable cause to believe Garcia 
had committed a misdemeanor very early on in the traffic stop, when Garcia 
could not produce a driver’s license and admitted he did not have a driver’s 
license.  That probable cause justified a constitutionally reasonable arrest and a 
search of Garcia’s person incident thereto.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
762-63 (1969); State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 874, 11 P.3d 489, 493 (Ct. App. 
2000).  The discovery of drugs on his person, plus other evidence of drug use 
and sales, provided grounds to search the car. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 
703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012) (probable cause provides grounds to search 
car under automobile exception); State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 118, 266 P.3d 
1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349-353 
(2009)) (warrantless search of a car incident to the arrest of an occupant 
reasonable “when it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the 
crime of arrest or when the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search”).  The district court employed an 
erroneous legal standard and erred when it granted suppression under the facts 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s 
order suppressing evidence and remand this matter for further proceedings.  
 DATED this 24th day of February, 2016. 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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